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China’s Maxim – Leave No Access Point 
Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’s BGP 
Hijacking 
Chris C.  Demchak1 
Yuval Shavitt2 
 
Hijacking Internet Traffic not covered by the anti-theft 2015 Xi-Obama Agreement 
Surprisingly, the voluntary 2015 Xi-Obama agreement stopping military forces from hacking 
commercial enterprises for economic gain did appear to dramatically reduce Chinese theft efforts 
against western targets.  China’s technological development process, however, was still dependent 
on massive expropriation of foreign R&D.  This necessitated new ways to get information while still 
technically adhering to the agreement.  Since the agreement only covered military activities, Chinese 
corporate state champions could be tasked with taking up the slack.  But even Chinese 
multinationals, such as Huawei or ZTE, were already being viewed with suspicion.  Instead data 
suggests the government opted to leverage a seemingly innocuous player – one that is normally 
viewed as a passive service provider – to target the foundational infrastructure of the internet to 
bypass the agreement, avoid detection, and provide the necessary access to information. 
Enter China Telecom3 – a large state champion telecommunications company – as an option.  While 
the 2015 agreement prohibited direct attacks on computer networks, it did nothing to prevent the 
hijacking of the vital internet backbone of western countries.  Conveniently, China Telecom has ten 
strategically placed, Chinese controlled internet ‘points of presence’4 (PoPs) across the internet 
backbone of North America.  Vast rewards can be reaped from the hijacking, diverting, and then 
copying of information-rich traffic going into or crossing the United States and Canada – often 
unnoticed and then delivered with only small delays. 
This essay will show how this hijacking works, and how China Telecom seems to employ its 
distributed points of presence (PoPs) in western democracies’ telecommunications systems to 
selectively redirect internet traffic through China.  It will show the observed routing paths, give a 
summary of how one hijacks parts of the internet by inserting these nodes, and outline the major 
security implications.  These Chinese PoPs are found all over the world including Europe and Asia.  
The prevalence of – and demonstrated ease with which – one can simply redirect and copy data by 
controlling key transit nodes buried in a nation’s infrastructure requires an urgent policy response.  To 
that end, we recommend an ‘Access Reciprocity’ strategy for vulnerable democracies – one that is 
                                            
1 Dr.  Chris C.  Demchak is the RDML Grace M.  Hopper Chair of Cyber Security at the U.S.  Naval War College and Director, Center of 
Cyber Conflict Studies, US Naval War College.  The views and ideas expressed here are the authors alone, and do not represent 
those of the US Government, the Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, or U.S. Naval War College. 
2 Dr.  Yuval Shavitt is a Professor of Electrical Engineering at Tel Aviv University and a member of its Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber 
Research Center.  He is also the CTO and original founder of BGProtect LTD. 
3 China Telecom owns ChinaNet in America. 
4 A ‘point-of-presence’ (PoP) is a major point of connection where a long-distance telecommunications carrier such as Verizon or British 
Telecom connects to a local network and picks up the local traffic – or transit traffic – to move it onwards towards its various 
destinations. 
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then collectively coordinated across allies for full effect.  The goal is to reduce hidden state-level 
internet hijacking options and fix the imbalance in information access and potential losses for civil 
societies.  Any single nation can unilaterally pursue this policy, but it will take the sum of consolidated 
democracies to have the scale to effectively deter this behavior over the longer term. 
How to Hijack the Net 
Successfully hijacking the net requires understanding how to manipulate key structures in contractual 
and regulatory agreements about who moves information packets to whom across the internet.  The 
Internet consists of tens of thousands of independently managed networks, interconnected through 
contractual peer-or-pay arrangements by which the data packets are exchanged.  Each of these 
networks is called an ‘Autonomous System’ (AS), meaning that network independently controls the 
access to and from all its internal network nodes.  Users inside that AS connect to other users in 
other networks through that AS’ own gateway servers.  A good example is a university’s own network 
whose students connect by routers to other students staying wholly inside the university’s ‘intranet’ or 
to others globally by passing the university’s gateway servers to reach the wider internet.   
For data traffic to move, addresses of senders and recipients are needed.  These ASs are each 
assigned a unique ‘Autonomous System Number’ (ASN) to identify itself globally for receipt of 
information packets.  Each AS controls a set of ‘internet protocol’ (IP) addresses assigned in blocks of 
consecutive numbers.5  These blocks are assigned much like telephone number area codes; for 
example, blocks in the US are now regulated in the US by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC).  If the AS is also an Internet Service Provider (ISP), it then further assigns some of the 
individual IP addresses it manages to home customers, and others in chunks of an address block to 
business customers.  Examples of ASNs are AS3356, which belongs to Level3, a tier-1 Internet 
Service Provider (ISP); AS5400, which belongs to British Telecom, a tier-2 ISP; AS8551, which 
belongs to Bezeq International, an Israeli ISP; AS25046, which belongs to Check Point Software, a 
leading cyber security company; and AS15169, which belongs to Google.   
In the internet, information is sent across intervening ASs as small data ‘packets’ with their 
destination IP addresses attached.  Each router in the transited networks looks at the destination IP 
address in the packet and forwards it to the next and closest AS according to a ‘forwarding table’.  The 
‘glue’ holding the Internet together uses two forms of software ‘protocols’- the Internet Protocol (IP) 
[RFC971] and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC 4271].  The IP defines how information is 
exchanged between end systems at the network level, and requires that every device connected to 
the Internet (such as a computer or a router) will have a unique global address, its IP address.  The 
source and destination IP addresses are placed in each packet of information which is sent out 
across the internet through the network of interconnected ASs.  The process is similar to how letters 
have to and from addresses and are moved between post offices and hubs before reaching their 
destination.   
Occupying critical nodes at the top of global internet data exchange system are the ‘tier 1’ providers 
whose influence in the paths taken by information flows can be enormous.  The global internet’s 
information exchange has never been free; the entire structure is a variable peer-or-pay system.  A 
                                            
5Internet Protocol (IP) are assigned to an Autonomous System (AS) by its Regional Internet Registry (RIR) such as ARIN in North 
America or APNIC in the Asia Pacific.  The RIRs, in turn, receive their regional blocks of IP addresses from the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) which is a department of the nonprofit Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
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small number of the very large ASs form the ‘tier 1’ or ‘backbone’ set of global ‘peers’ who contract 
among each other to share massive volumes of traffic reciprocally without paying transit fees.  The 
tier 1 set of global peers may each have more than one ASN as part of their holdings.  For example, 
Verizon Enterprise Solutions (formerly UUNET (MCI) and XO Communications) has over a dozen 
ASNs (e.g., AS701, AS702, AS703, AS2828).  All other ASs must pay for – or specially negotiate – 
packet traffic transiting arrangements.  The long distance carriers – i.e., the telecommunications 
corporations or agencies – own and operate the major PoPs connecting the traffic across all the ASs, 
and thereby control the major nodes of the entire internet traffic flow. 
While the paths built for any set of messages across ASNs are based on multiple economic and 
engineering criteria, a key requirement is to select the shortest route to its destination IP address.  
Critical to moving traffic across the sea of tier 1 and other ASNs are the ‘forwarding tables’ which 
show the next – and closest – AS router for a given packet to cross.  The servers hosting the ‘Border 
Gateway Protocol’ (BGP) – the key Internet routing protocol – build these forwarding tables which are 
shared across each contributing AS.  Within the BGP forwarding tables, administrators of each AS 
announce to their AS neighbors the IP address blocks that their AS owns, whether to be used as a 
destination or a convenient transit node.   
Errors can occur given the complexity of configuring BGP, and these possible errors offer covert 
actors a number of hijack opportunities.  If network AS1 mistakenly announces through its BGP that it 
owns an IP block that actually is owned by network AS2, traffic from a portion of the Internet destined 
for AS2 will actually be routed to – and through – AS1.  If the erroneous announcement was 
maliciously arranged, then a BGP hijack has occurred.  The amount of traffic routed from AS1 to AS2 
depends on a variety of factors, and it can have almost global effects.  A fundamental presumption 
behind the current internet protocol is that geography and physics still matter.  The routing is biased 
to shorter routes simply because the transfer of electrons across a longer distance takes more time 
and incurs greater risk of routine and basic distortions in the data.  Thus, if a routing table falsely 
specifies what the shortest distance is, the data will automatically attempt to move that way.   
Building a successful BGP hijack attack is complex, but much easier with the support of a complicit 
and preferably largescale ISP that is more likely to be included as a central transit point among a sea 
of ASs.  As a result, today most BGP hijacks are the work of government agencies or large 
transnational criminal organizations with access to, leverage over, or control of strategically placed 
ISPs.  For example, in 2008, Pakistan Telecom – the tier 1 AS for Pakistan – accidentally hijacked all 
Youtube traffic for several hours as administrators make mistakes in using routing to censor a clip 
considered non-Islamic.  Two years later, on April 8th, 2010 China Telecom hijacked 15% of the 
Internet traffic for 18 minutes in what is believed to be both a large-scale experiment and a 
demonstration of Chinese capabilities in controlling the flows of the internet.   
Over the past few years, researchers at BGProtect LTD based on the DIMES project [DIMES] at the 
Tel Aviv University built a route tracing system monitoring the BGP announcements and 
distinguishing patterns suggesting accidental or deliberate hijacking6 across many routes 
simultaneously and with a granularity down to the individual city.  Using this technique, the two 
                                            
6 No technical details will be provided in this piece.  For more technical information, contact Dr.  Yuval Shavitt, Tel Aviv University. 
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authors of this paper noticed unusual and systematic hijacking patterns associated with China 
Telecom.   
The Security Implications 
Hijack attacks expose a network to potentially critical damage because it is not a hack of the endpoint 
but of the critical exchanges carrying information between end points.  The rerouted traffic flows 
sensitive data across the collection points of an intervening adversary without any human clicking on 
suspicious links or a network administrator seeing any surges in unexplained data transfers.  This 
gives the malicious attacker access to the organization’s network, to stealing valuable data, adding 
malicious implants to seemingly normal traffic, or simply modifying or corrupting valuable data.  If 
diverted and copied for even small amounts of time, even encrypted traffic can be broken, as shown 
in the well known, recent ‘DROWN’ and ’Logjam’ encryption attacks. 
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can neutralize an organization’s firewall, for example.  In this form 
of attack, a bad actor inserts its covert collection method between the sender and real desired 
destination, between the end points.  For another example, with the traffic rerouted into an 
adversary’s cache, the attacker can learn enough to impersonate trusted sources in or to the attacked 
network, especially valuable in obtaining validated certificates.  The data can be used for widely 
successful phishing attempts through email, voice, or texting attacks. [Rexford]  Impersonation 
attacks can allow the malicious attacker to harvest passwords of the company’s web users.  With 
those keys to the victim’s network in hand, attackers can distort, disconnect, or destroy any part of the 
company’s network accessible from the Internet, increasingly to include critical financial and physical 
systems and their backups. 
Despite all the discussion of how geography has been defeated by the global cyberspace, the closer 
a network is to the attacker or its complicit ISP, the more likely an attack will succeed because 
defending administrators are less likely to have enough time to detect, analyze, and mitigate the 
attack.  Thus, if an attacker wants its attack to be more potent, they need to use a network that has 
global presence, or in other words, a network that is not too far from any potential victim network.  For 
a government, the wider the geographical spread of its own and controlled networks, the more their 
global reach can help with orchestrating such attacks.   
China Telecom Well Placed in North America 
China Telecom (CT) entered North American networks at the beginning of the 2000s, and has since 
grown to have 10 PoPs, eight in the US and two in Canada, spanning both coasts and all the major 
exchange points in the US.  Few other non-American ISPs has such a wide-spread presence on US 
soil.   
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Figure 1: China Telecom’s large presence in North America (image taken from the CT web site) 
Using these numerous PoPs, CT has already relatively seamlessly hijacked domestic US and cross-
US traffic and redirected it to China over days, weeks, and months as demonstrated in the examples 
below.  The patterns of traffic revealed in traceroute research7 suggest repetitive IP hijack attacks 
committed by China Telecom.  While one may argue such attacks can always be explained by 
‘normal’ BGP behavior, these in particular suggest malicious intent, precisely because of their 
unusual transit characteristics – namely the lengthened routes and the abnormal durations.  The 
following are a set of such unusual cases. 
Canada to Korea, 2016 – traffic to Government Site 
Starting from February 2016 and for about 6 months, routes from Canada to Korean government sites 
were hijacked by China Telecom and routed through China.  Figure 2a shows the shortest and 
normal route: Canada-US-Korea.  As shown in figure 2b, however, the hijacked route started at the 
China Telecom PoP in Toronto, the traffic was then forwarded inside the Chinese network to their 
PoP on the US West Coast, from there to China, and finally to delivery in Korea.  This is a perfect 
scenario for long term espionage, where the victim’s local protections won’t raise alaems about the 
long term traffic detours.  Note that the shortest route between the originators and the destination is 
definitely not through two China Telcom PoPs in North America to China and only then to Korea.  
That this pattern continued for six months is good evidence that this was no short term 
misconfiguration or temporary internet conditions disruption.  This attack repeated later for shorter 
time durations. 
                                            
7 Traceroute research involves tracing the routes along which traffic is sent across the internet and uses a variety of data sources 
including especially the globally published routing tables.   The process involves acquisition and analysis of enormous quantities of 
traffic data. 
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Figure 2a: The normal and shortest route from Canada to Korea before the hijack. 
 
Figure 2b: The hijacked route through the CT PoP in Maryland – a long way from Canada to Korea. 
 
US to Italy Oct.  2016 – Banking and Money 
On October 2016, traffic from several locations in the USA to a large Anglo-American bank 
headquarters in Milan, Italy was hijacked by China Telecom to China.  The normal route is shown in 
figure 3a and the hijacked route in figure 3b.  The attack started at the ChinaNet8 PoP near Los 
Angeles and, while it lasted for 9 hours, it did not seem well planned.  ChinaNet actors seemed to 
have difficulties in routing the traffic back to Milan.  The route inside the Chinese network changed 
several times as the attackers worked to try and redirect the traffic back.  Ultimately, they seemed to 
give up sending it on and the traffic never arrived.   
 
Figure 3a: US large bank to Italy normal route 
 
Figure 3b: US large bank to Italy but after hijack, traffic never arrives, seems to terminate in China. 
                                            
8 Wholly owned unit of China Telecom. 
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 Scandinavia to Japan, April-May 2017 – News  
Traffic from Sweden and Norway to the Japanese network of a large American news organization 
was hijacked to China for about 6 weeks in April/May 2017.   As shown in figure 4, the hijack started 
in China Telecom PoP in Maryland and forwarded to their PoP in California.  From there traffic was 
redirected to China and then through Hong Kong to Japan.  By no stretch could this period of 
disjointed routing have been accidental. 
 
Figure 4: A deflected route from Oslo, Norway to Tokyo, Japan. 
Italy to Thailand April-July 2017 – ISPs 
Traffic to the mail server (and other IP addresses) of a large financial company in Thailand was 
hijacked several times during April, May, and July 2017.Some of the hijack attacks started in the 
USA.  As shown in figure 5, traffic sent from Milan, Italy to Bangkok was hijacked by a ChinaNet PoP 
in California.  This hijack affected at least two large International American based providers: Cogent 
and Level3.  In parallel there was an attack on providers in South Korea. 
 
Figure 5: Traffic from Milan, Italy during hijack to China. 
 
US Telecoms Blackballed from China – No Reciprocity 
China’s own national network is fairly isolated from the world, protecting it from foreign hijacking of its 
own domestic or transit traffic.  There are, in principle, only three major internet gateways into China, 
located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.  Hong Kong serves as a large international exchange, 
a legacy of the time it was ruled by Great Britain.  Many International companies have PoPs in Hong 
Kong, but this network is isolated from the rest of China.  In fact, the Hong Kong major internet hub 
presents a great opportunity for China to hijack traffic that traverse it, usually with one end point of the 
communication being in the Asia Pacific region.  Elsewhere in China, US based ISPs have no 
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presence.  AT&T has publicized that is has presence in China, but this seems to be only in 
collaboration with a local player, and not an AT&T directly owned and managed operation. 
Policy of ‘Access Reciprocity’ to Curb Hijacks 
Today China has ten POPs in North America (eight in the US and two in Canada) while the US has 
none in China.  That imbalance in access allows for opportunistic malicious behavior by China 
through China Telecom at a time and place of its choosing, while denying the same to US and its 
allies.  Note that the hijacked routes come from – or are traveling to – allied states, but the traffic 
stumbles on China Telecom’s PoPs due to the shortest route bias in BGP rules and then is hijacked 
in the US by the Chinese network.  If China Telecom had only one PoP – say in Los Angeles at most 
– then hijacks would be more difficult to achieve and to obscure from oversight.  One could even 
argue that fairness dictates that China Telecom should not extend beyond Hong Kong unless other 
global peers were given equivalent access to have PoPs in China itself.   
A new policy is needed: an “Access Reciprocity” policy on internet PoPs located in North America or, 
indeed, even with allied democratic nations.  One could use many metrics to establish the PoPs 
allowed, including a population metric for example.  That is, the US at 350 million citizens currently 
hosts eight China Telecom PoPs.  With China at three times that population, the US Telecoms should 
be allowed three times that number of PoPs in China.  The advantage of such a metric is that it 
makes evident the imbalance of one nation having multiple PoPs in another nation or region, while 
the latter have none and are not allowed any in the first nation.  Or, if a demand for access reciprocity 
is refused, then an appropriate defense policy in response could state that no traffic to or from or 
across the US or ally be allowed to enter a CT PoP in the US or in the ally’s networks.  That policy 
could be inserted in BGPs routing tables as required and automatically implemented. 
The advantages of a stated ‘Access Reciprocity’ policy is that it embodies interstate fairness, 
enhances cyber security of the US and its allies, and can be implemented into existing routing tables.  
Any single nation can decide to pursue this policy, but only the sum of democratic civil societies 
acting in agreement to have the scale to effectively deter this malicious behavior over the longer term. 
Furthermore, if such an allied ‘Access Reciprocity’ agreement emerges in the form of coordinated 
national policies and institutions, the possibility rises for a regional and possibly international IT norm 
emerging from practice in other domains.  Over time, basic reciprocal fairness in digital transnational 
exchanges could come to be viewed as desirable, clarifying, and effective in nurturing cooperation in 
a hostile, “asocial” global environment. [Axelrod]  Imagine if reciprocal fairness included security and 
privacy scrutiny of a Chinese manufacturer’s source code before its product or any updates may be 
imported into the US or its allies – as is now the law in China.   
More balance between democratic and authoritarian information technology systems by enforcing 
reciprocal fairness is likely have a significant positive influence on the currently deleterious trends in 
international cyber insecurity.  This could be first step in making hijacking internet traffic much more 
difficult and costly for adversaries.  If such a policy were tied to a broader multi-sector cyber 
operational resilience alliance (CORA) among democracies, then it provides another legal and 
feasible tool for use by these nations in defending their wellbeing and survival in a contested, deeply 
cybered world. [CORA] 
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